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 2.1  Introduction 
 Wars are large-scale confl icts between organized groups of belligerents, which involve 
suff ering, devastation, and brutality unlike almost anything else in human experience. 
Whatever one’s other beliefs about morality, all should agree that the horrors of war are 
all but unconscionable, and that warfare can be justifi ed only if we have some compel-
ling account of what is worth fi ghting for, which can justify contributing, as individu-
als and as groups, to this calamitous endeavour. 
 Although this question should obviously be central to both philosophical and politi-
cal discussion about war, it is at the forefront of neither. In recent years, philosophical 
discussion of warfare has bloomed, but the debate has focused on whom we may kill, 
on the assumption that our aims are justifi ed. 1 Political debate, meanwhile, is more 
concerned with matters of prudence, international law, and public justifi cation, than 
with reassessing what is worth fi ghting for. 2 
  *  Th is chapter was initially conceived while at the institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Confl ict, University 
of Oxford. It was written while a Research Fellow at the Centre for Moral, Social and Political Th eory, in the 
School of Philosophy, ANU, and completed under an ARC Discovery Early Career Research Award. Earlier 
versions were presented at Henry Shue’s war workshop, the second ELAC annual conference, and at the 
ANU. Many thanks to the audiences of those talks, and in particular to Henry Shue, David Rodin, Cécile 
Fabre, Jeff  McMahan, and Christian Barry. 
  1  For an overview of the recent debate, see  Seth  Lazar , ‘War’, in  Hugh  Lafollette (ed.),  International 
Encyclopaedia of Ethics ( Oxford :  Wiley Blackwell , 2013). Please update the reference 
  2  For example, of the fi ve diff erent inquiries into British participation in the Iraq war carried out in recent 
years, only the Chilcot Inquiry had the purposes and legality of the invasion within its remit, and it remains 
to be seen how prominent a role this will play in its fi nal report, as contrasted with the emphasis on pro-
cess. See  Richard  Norton-Taylor ,  ‘Iraq War Inquiry Report Delayed’ ,  Th e Guardian , 16 November  2011 ;  Mark 
 Tran ,  ‘Q&A the Iraq War Inquiry’ ,  Th e Guardian , 24 November  2009 . Similarly, the 2010 Strategic Defence 
Review, which had the remit to consider the whole military posture of the United Kingdom, confi ned itself 
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 For wars of intervention to halt or prevent massive humanitarian crises, this gap 
is not so troubling. When warfare is the only means to prevent the mass killing or 
enslavement of the innocent, the purposes of military force are clear enough (though 
undoubtedly many other problems remain).  Th e problem is more pressing, how-
ever, for the justifi cation of national defence. 3 Although common-sense morality 
and international law view national defence as the paradigm case of justifi ed warfare, 
grounding this consensus is surprisingly diffi  cult. 4 We typically believe that any state 
is justifi ed in using lethal force to protect its territory against any form of uninvited 
military incursion by any other state. And yet we lack a good argument to explain why 
this should be so. 
 In this chapter, I  explain why one familiar and otherwise plausible approach to 
the justifi cation of killing in war cannot adequately ground common-sense views of 
permissible national defence. 5 Reductionists believe that justifi ed warfare reduces to 
an aggregation of acts that are justifi ed under ordinary principles of interpersonal 
morality. 6 Th e standard form of reductionism focuses on the principles governing 
killing in ordinary life, specifi cally those that justify intentional killing in self- and 
other-defence, and unintended but foreseen (for short, collateral) killing as a lesser 
evil. Justifi ed warfare, on this view, is no more than the coextension of multiple acts 
justifi ed under these two principles. 
 Reductionism is the default philosophical approach to thinking through the ethics 
of killing in war. It makes perfect sense to ask what principles govern permissible kill-
ing in general, before applying them to the particular context of war. If it cannot deliver 
to budgetary questions, without asking just what we should be using our military for. See David Rodin, 
‘Defence Review Is an Opportunity, Not a Th reat, to Our Military’, 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/oct/13/defence-review-is-opportunity-not-threat 
(accessed 28 December 2011). 
  3  Th is locution is somewhat unfortunate, because, on most accounts, rights of national defence accrue to 
states, not to nations. 
  4  Th e most coherent articulation of conventional views about the ethics of war remains  Michael  Walzer’s 
classic,  Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations ( New York :  Basic Books ,  2006 ) . 
For international law governing the permissibility of armed resistance against armed attack, see, for example, 
article 51 of the UN Charter, and the recent Annex to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
  5  Obviously to justify warfare we have to justify other acts besides killing; clearly, however, if the killing 
cannot be justifi ed, then the rest of the discussion is moot. 
  6  Th e term is coined in  David  Rodin ,  War and Self-Defence ( Oxford :  Clarendon Press ,  2002 ):  124 . Th e 
most prominent exemplar is Jeff  McMahan, see for example  Jeff   McMahan ,  ‘War as Self-Defence’ ,  Ethics & 
International Aff airs ,  18 / 1 ( 2004 ),  75–80 . Other adherents include  Richard J.  Arneson ,  ‘Just Warfare Th eory 
and Noncombatant Immunity’ ,  Cornell International Law Journal ,  39 ( 2006 ),  663–88 ;  Tony  Coady , ‘Th e 
Status of Combatants’, in  David  Rodin and  Henry  Shue (eds.),  Just and Unjust Warriors: Th e Moral and Legal 
Status of Soldiers ( Oxford :   Oxford University Press ,  2008 ),  153–75 ;  Cécile  Fabre ,  A Cosmopolitan Th eory 
of the Just War ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2012 ) ;  Helen  Frowe ,  ‘Self-Defence and the Principle of 
Non-Combatant Immunity’ ,  Journal of Moral Philosophy ,  8 / 4 ( 2011 )  530–46 ;  Lionel  McPherson ,  ‘Innocence 
and Responsibility in War’ ,  Canadian Journal of Philosophy ,  34 / 4 ( 2004 ),  485–506 ;  Seumas  Miller , ‘Civilian 
Immunity, Forcing the Choice, and Collective Responsibility’, in  Igor  Primoratz (ed.),  Civilian Immunity 
in War ( Oxford :   Oxford University Press ,  2007 ),  113–35 ;  Gerhard  Øverland ,  ‘Killing Civilians’ ,  European 
Journal of Philosophy ,  13 / 3 ( 2005 ),  345–63 ;  David  Rodin , ‘Th e Moral Inequality of Soldiers: Why Jus in Bello 
Asymmetry Is Half Right’, in  Rodin and  Shue (eds.),  Just and Unjust Warriors ,  44–68 . 
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a plausible set of conclusions about when national defence is permitted, then we must 
either revise our beliefs about which conclusions count as plausible, or else face the 
signifi cant challenge of developing a diff erent theoretical model for justifying war-
fare—an exceptionalist model, which views war as an exception to the regular moral 
landscape, to which principles apply which apply to nothing else but war. 7 We must 
show, in other words, that there is something worth fi ghting for in wars of national 
defence, which is not engaged when we use force in any other context. 
 Th e chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the argument against reduc-
tionism. 8 Section 2.3 considers and rebuts one common response to the argument, 
which has oft en been thought suffi  cient grounds to disregard its conclusion. Section 
2.4 then asks whether a modifi ed reductionism would survive unscathed by the argu-
ment. Finally, section 2.5 sets out some desiderata on a plausible exceptionalist alterna-
tive. Section 2.6 concludes. 
 2.2  Th e Argument from Political Aggression 
 Th e argument from political aggression, sometimes also called the bloodless invasion 
objection, is conceived as a  reductio ad absurdum of standard reductionism. Th e fol-
lowing is an attempt to render it as precise as possible (commentary follows): 
  1.  Th e reductionist theory of the ethics of war states that permissible acts of killing 
in war are permissible under the relevant principles of ordinary interpersonal 
morality. 
  2.  Th e relevant principles of ordinary interpersonal morality are those justifying 
intentional killing in self-defence, and collateral killing as a lesser evil. 
  3.  On the most permissive plausible account of self-defence, B may intentionally 
kill A in self-defence to avert an unjustifi ed threat T only if either 
 a.  T will harm some person’s lesser interests, and A has culpably contributed 
to T or 
 b.  T will harm some person’s vital interests, and A has culpably or nonculpably 
contributed to T. 
  7  Walzer for the most part simply assumed exceptionalism, without seeking to defend it (although see 
Walzer,  Just and Unjust Wars , 128 and  Michael  Walzer ,  ‘Response to McMahan’s Paper’ ,  Philosophia ,  34 / 1 
( 2006 ),  43–5 . While others have recognized the fl aws in reductionism (e.g.  Henry  Shue , ‘Do We Need a 
Morality of War?’, in  David  Rodin and  Henry  Shue (eds.),  Just and Unjust Warriors ,  87–111 . ), I am not aware 
of any fully-fl edged attempt to provide plausible foundations for an exceptionalist alternative. Although see 
Yitzhak Benbaji’s work, for one possible counterexample  Yitzhak  Benbaji ,  ‘A Defence of the Traditional War 
Convention’ ,  Ethics ,  118 / 3 ( 2008 ),  464–95 ;  Yitzhak  Benbaji ,  ‘Th e Moral Power of Soldiers to Undertake the 
Duty of Obedience’ ,  Ethics , 122/1 (2011), 43–73  and  chapter 7 in this volume. Please provide volume number 
and page range for the reference 
  8  Th is argument is an attempt at a more precise and compelling formulation of a familiar objection, dis-
cussed for example by Richard Norman and David Rodin. See  Richard  Norman ,  Ethics, Killing and War 
( Cambridge and New York :  Cambridge University Press ,  1995 ),  133 ; Rodin,  War and Self-Defence , 133–8, and 
 chapter 4 in this volume. 
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  4.  On the most permissive plausible account of collateral killing, B may collater-
ally kill C to avert outcome O only if either 
 a.  O involves harm to some person’s lesser interests, and C has culpably con-
tributed to O or 
 b.  O involves harm to some person’s vital interests, and C has culpably or non-
culpably contributed to O. 
  5.  In wars against aggression, the aggressor cannot be repelled without 
 a.  Intentionally killing many people who have not culpably contributed to the 
outcome that we thereby avert and 
 b.  collaterally killing many people who have not culpably contributed to the 
outcome that we thereby avert. 
  6.  Th ere are some purely political wars, in which the aggressors threaten only the 
victims’ interests in their state’s continued political control of some territory—
their purely political interests. 
  7.  Individuals’ purely political interests are not among their vital interests. 
  8.  A theory of the ethics of war that cannot endorse lethal defence against purely 
political aggression should be rejected on those grounds. 
 C1 (from 2 to 7): Combatants fi ghting against a purely political aggression cannot, 
under the relevant principles of ordinary interpersonal morality, permissibly 
kill all the people whom they must kill in repelling the aggression. 
 C2 (from 1 and C1): Reductionism cannot justify fi ghting wars of defence against 
purely political aggression. 
 C3 (from C2 and 8): Reductionism should be rejected as a theory of the ethics of war. 
 Premise 1 formulates the genus reductionism, while premises 2 to 4 individuate one 
species, what I call standard reductionism. Premises 5 and 6 make descriptive claims 
about warfare in general, and a subset of actual and likely wars. Premise 7 is an evalua-
tive claim, about the signifi cance of the interests at stake in the wars described in prem-
ise 6. Premise 8 is likewise evaluative, positing that the ability to justify warfare against 
purely political aggression is a  sine qua non of a plausible account of the ethics of war. 
Th e following subsections discuss each segment of the argument in greater depth. 
 2.2.1  Standard reductionism 
 Th e fi rst four premises of the bloodless invasion objection formulate its target. Premise 
1 is the most general; it simply identifi es the defi ning commitment of a reductionist 
theory of the ethics of war. Premise 2 specifi es the principles that, on the standard 
reductionist view, justify intentional and collateral killing in ordinary life. Th ere are 
other possible variants of reductionism, which would not affi  rm premise 2. For exam-
ple, a thoroughgoing act-consequentialist might contend that the relevant principle 
of interpersonal morality is ‘maximize value’. Th e objection targets only the standard 
form of reductionism (in section 2.4 below, I will consider whether reductionism can 
be saved from the bloodless invasion objection by proposing an alternative premise 2). 
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 Premises 3 and 4 each identify one feature of the relevant principles governing, 
respectively, self-defence justifi cations of intentional killing, and lesser evil justifi ca-
tions of collateral killing. 9 Th e argument is intended to target all variants of standard 
reductionism, therefore it is important to remain neutral on most questions in the eth-
ics of self-defence and collateral killing. Th e objection therefore focuses on one narrow 
area of each theory, one question to which any account of self-defence and collateral 
killing must have an answer: when is killing in self-defence, or collateral killing, pro-
portionate? 10 Satisfying proportionality is necessary but not suffi  cient to justify kill-
ing in self-defence or as a lesser evil. Th e other conditions on justifi ed killing are not 
important for the present argument. 
 In general, the use of force to avert an outcome is proportionate if there is (at least) 
an appropriate fi t between the force used, and the outcome averted. Precisely what this 
amounts to will depend on numerous factors. 11 However, in extreme cases we know 
disproportionality when we see it: if A threatens to bruise B’s leg, and B uses lethal 
defensive force to avert that threat, then B’s action clearly does not satisfy proportion-
ality; similarly, if B can avert the bruised leg only through action that kills C, an unin-
volved bystander, as a side-eff ect, then B’s action again does not satisfy proportionality. 
In neither case does the relevant fi t obtain. 
 Th e proportionality constraint on self-defence and collateral killing can be more or 
less permissive. Th e argument from political aggression contends that standard reduc-
tionism is insuffi  ciently permissive to justify killing in wars against purely political 
aggression, so it is stronger the more permissive the variant of reductionism that we 
presuppose (since it will apply a fortiori to any more restrictive variant). Premises 3 
and 4 therefore identify the most permissive plausible take on proportionality in 
self-defence and collateral killing. 
 In many legal systems, and in ordinary moral thinking as well, lethal defence is war-
ranted only against an attacker who threatens the defender’s vital interests. 12 Since the 
argument depends only on claiming that purely political interests are not vital, we 
do not need a full list of which interests are vital. However, most will agree that our 
interests in not being killed, seriously wounded, or tortured, raped or kidnapped are 
suffi  ciently vital that we can justifi ably kill in their defence. Conversely, some inter-
ests clearly fall below the relevant threshold of importance, for example my interest in 
retaining some particular sum of money, or in avoiding all physical harm whatsoever. 
 Although this view of proportionality in self-defence is widespread, some will regard 
it as insuffi  ciently permissive. Th ey think that the proportionality constraint limits us 
  9  Th is locution encompasses justifi cations for collateral killing that appeal to the doctrine of double eff ect. 
  10  McMahan calls proportionality in self-defence narrow proportionality, and in collateral harm wide pro-
portionality  Jeff   McMahan ,  Killing in War ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2009 ),  21 . 
  11  For a detailed discussion of some of these factors, see  David  Rodin ,  ‘Justifying Harm’ ,  Ethics ,  122 / 1 ( 2011 ), 
 74–110 . 
  12  For example, the Model Penal Code permits the use of deadly force in self-defence only to avert death, 
serious bodily injury, forcible rape, or kidnapping (§ 3.04(2)(b)(i)). 
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to killing in defence of our vital interests only if the person killed is morally innocent 
with respect to the threat we are thereby averting. However, if she is to some degree 
culpable for that threat, then lethal defence might be proportionate to protect even our 
less than vital interests. Her culpability justifi es discounting her interests, so that it is 
proportionate to kill her to avert a threat which it would be disproportionate to kill her 
to avert, if she were innocent with respect to it. 13 Precisely how that discount should 
be applied is open to debate. However, if our aim is still to ensure a fi t between the 
threat averted and the defensive force used, then presumably the degree of discount 
should vary with the degree of culpability. Th e more culpable the target, the greater the 
discount applied to her interests. Th us when a target is barely culpable—for example 
because she has a strong but not complete excuse for her action that contributed to the 
threat—the discount will be less than when her contribution is without excuse, and the 
threat averted by killing her must be proportionally more serious. 
 Th is is the most permissive plausible position on proportionality in self-defence. 
As premise 4 suggests, proportionality in collateral damage should be understood in 
a similar way. How serious must the outcome averted by B be, to render killing C as an 
unintended but foreseen side-eff ect proportionate? 14 
 At fi rst glance, the most permissive view plausible would be that the prospective 
harm averted should at least be more than marginally greater than the harm suff ered 
by C (i.e. death). Th is follows if we believe that people’s interests enjoy moral protection 
over and above their impartially considered worth. If I can permissibly infl ict x harm 
on you, in the course of averting x+1 harm to myself, then your interests enjoy no addi-
tional protection. 15 Th ey are merely quanta to be included in an overall aggregation of 
aff ected interests. Although a reductionist could hold this view, standard reduction-
ism asserts that people’s interests are protected by rights, so marginal interpersonal 
trade-off s of this sort are prohibited. If the victims of collateral harming are protected 
by rights against being harmed, as we will assume that they are, then the exchange 
rate between harm infl icted and averted must be steeper than this. Th e harm averted 
must be more than marginally greater than the harm infl icted. Since collateral killing 
involves irremediable harm to the victim’s most vital interests, it can be justifi ed only if 
we thereby protect the vital interests of a greater number of others. 
  13  Kai  Draper ,  ‘Defence’ ,  Philosophical Studies ,  145 ( 2009 ),  69–88 :  81;  Kimberly  Ferzan ,  ‘Justifying 
Self-Defence’ ,  Law and Philosophy ,  24 / 6 ( 2005 ),  711–49 :  735;  Frances M.  Kamm ,  ‘Failures of Just War 
Th eory:  Terror, Harm, and Justice’ ,  Ethics ,  114 / 4 ( 2004 ),  650–92 :  676;  Tziporah  Kasachkoff  ,  ‘Killing in 
Self-Defence: An Unquestionable or Problematic Defence?’ ,  Law and Philosophy ,  17 / 5 ( 1998 ),  509–31 :  528–29 ; 
 Jeff   McMahan ,  ‘Self-Defence and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker’ ,  Ethics ,  104 / 2 ( 1994 ),  252–90 :  265–
66 ; Rodin, ‘Justifying Harm’;  Daniel  Statman ,  ‘Can Wars Be Fought Justly? Th e Necessity Condition Put to 
the Test’ ,  Journal of Moral Philosophy ,  8 / 3 ( 2011 ),  435–51 : 683. 
  14  I am assuming that there is a morally relevant diff erence between collateral and intentional killing; 
some, of course, would deny this. However, they would presumably argue that collateral killing is as seri-
ously wrong as intentional killing, not the other way round. Th eir view, therefore, would be more restrictive 
than those discussed here, and so would be vulnerable to the same criticisms. 
  15  Seth  Lazar ,  ‘Th e Nature and Disvalue of Injury’ ,  Res Publica ,  15 / 3 ( 2009 ),  289–304 . 
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 Th ere are two ways to make our account of proportionality in collateral harm more 
permissive. First, we can deploy just the same reasoning as applied in individual 
self-defence. When there is some reason to discount the interests of the victim of col-
lateral harm, it can be proportionate to infl ict that harm even if lesser interests are at 
stake. Hence 4a mirrors 3a. 16 
 Second, we might argue that individuals enjoy an agent-centred prerogative to give 
their own interests more weight in their moral reasoning than is warranted by their 
impartially considered worth. 17 In that case, it might be possible to justify infl icting x 
harm on you, in order to avert x+1, or even x harm to myself, without evincing disre-
gard for your right not to be harmed. Although your right against being harmed puts 
a thumb in the scales for you, my agent-centred prerogative puts one in the scales for 
me too. However, even if we do endorse this agent-centred prerogative (which raises 
its own problems), it is surely implausible to suggest that B may collaterally kill C in 
the course of averting an outcome that threatens anything other than B’s vital interests, 
at least provided C is morally innocent with respect to the outcome that B is aiming 
to avert. 
 In summary, on the most permissive plausible interpretation of ordinary interper-
sonal morality, unless there is some strong reason to discount our victim’s interests—
in particular, her culpability for the outcome that we are trying to avert—we may kill 
either collaterally or in self-defence only in the preservation of vital interests. 
 2.2.2  Warfare and purely political aggression 
 Premise 5 makes two descriptive claims about wars against aggression: that they can-
not be fought without collaterally killing many people, and intentionally killing many 
others, who are not culpable for the outcomes we thereby avert. Note that warfare also 
involves much else besides these two classes of act. Nonetheless, for warfare to be justi-
fi ed, these collateral and intentional killings must be justifi ed. 
 Premises  5a and 5b do not specify necessary truths about warfare. It is possible to 
conceive of wars where neither claim holds. Nonetheless, in practice I think each is 
a truism, denial of which evinces a troubling misapprehension of the moral serious-
ness of war. If we could fi ght wars in which all those whom we killed were culpable for 
the threats that we seek to avert, then warfare would not seem such a dreadful thing. 
Although the good guys will undoubtedly suff er losses too, they can be sure that they 
will kill only the bad guys, so although there are prudential risks in war, there are no 
or few moral risks. It just seems wildly unrealistic to imagine that warfare could be so 
morally congenial. Even with all the time, eff ort, and institutional structures that we 
  16  McMahan,  Killing in War , 218. 
  17  See e.g.  Cécile  Fabre ,  ‘Permissible Rescue Killings’ ,  Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society ,  109 / 1 pt2 
( 2009 ),  149–64 ;  Helen  Frowe ,  ‘A Practical Account of Self-Defence’ ,  Law and Philosophy ,  29 ( 2010 ),  245–72 ; 
 Jonathan  Quong ,  ‘Killing in Self-Defence’ ,  Ethics ,  119 / 2 ( 2009 ),  507–37 . For the idea of an agent-centred pre-
rogative see  Samuel  Scheffl  er ,  Th e Rejection of Consequentialism ( Oxford :  Clarendon Press ,  1994 ). 
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put in place, we fail to ensure that only the guilty are harmed by our system of criminal 
justice. It would be extraordinary if, despite lacking any of the mechanisms by which 
the justice system targets its harms to the culpable, warfare were able to deliver results 
more congruent with people’s degree of guilt. 
 Premise 5b should go through unquestioned. Th e victims of collateral harms are 
usually (although not only) civilians (of either side—we are not solely concerned with 
collateral harms to the adversary, but to our co-citizens as well). Although counting 
the casualties of war is fraught with problems, as is drawing the line between civilians 
and combatants, and although highly infl ated fi gures are oft en touted, even conserva-
tive estimates suggest that in recent wars civilians suff er in at least as great numbers as 
combatants. 18 As long as the battlefi eld is on populated territory, we can be quite sure 
that innocent people will be collaterally killed. 
 Some will be more sceptical about 5a, the thesis that winning a war presupposes 
intentionally killing many innocent people. Th ey will argue that wars can be won 
without ever intentionally killing noncombatants, and that all combatants are to some 
degree culpable for the threat that we avert by killing them. 19 I have discussed each of 
these arguments in depth elsewhere; moreover, it is precisely the focus on this aspect of 
the ethics of war which this volume is intended to redress. 20 Our goal here is to explore 
the purposes of military force, not to (again) consider the responsibilities of soldiers. 
Th ree observations, however, are in order. 
 First, the truth of 5b (that warfare inevitably involves collaterally killing the inno-
cent) is suffi  cient for the objection to go through. Premise 5a gives it more purchase, 
but is not necessary. Second, the objection would still have considerable force if we 
focused not on total innocence, but on near-innocence. As noted above, where some-
one is only marginally culpable for contributing to an unjustifi ed threat that killing 
him helps to avert, the discount applied to his interests must be proportionate to his 
degree of culpability. Arguably where he is barely culpable, killing him to avoid a threat 
to lesser interests remains disproportionate. Th ird, the culpability of combatants can 
be diminished in two ways: by excuse, and by non-contribution. If victory presupposes 
intentionally killing combatants whose contribution to the outcome that we thereby 
avert is negligible or non-existent, then our basis for discounting their interests dis-
appears. As I have argued elsewhere, and as Jeff  McMahan notes in this volume: in 
  18  Prompted by widespread touting of the claim that 90 per cent of the victims of war are civilians, Adam 
Roberts has off ered a sceptical analysis of a wide range of datasets. His aim is to show that the idea of a 9:1 
civilian to military casualty ratio is unfounded, but even on more measured evidence, civilians suff er at least 
as much, if not more than the military in modern wars. And not only in complex civil wars, note, where civil-
ians are habitually targeted. Estimates for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for example, suggest that between March 
2003 and June 2006 between fi ve and three civilians died for every military casualty (he cites the Brookings 
Institution Iraq Index, and the Iraq Body Count respectively).  Adam  Roberts ,  ‘Lives and Statistics: Are 90% 
of War Victims Civilians?’ ,  Survival ,  52 / 3 ( 2010 ),  115–36 . 
  19  See e.g. Rodin, ‘Moral Inequality of Soldiers’. 
  20  Seth  Lazar ,  ‘Responsibility, Risk, and Killing in Self-Defence’ ,  Ethics ,  119 / 4 ( 2009 ),  699–728 ;  Seth  Lazar , 
 ‘Th e Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War’ ,  Philosophy & Public Aff airs ,  38 / 2 ( 2010 ),  180–213 . 
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warfare in general, and in purely political aggression in particular, the contribution 
made by any individual combatant to the purely political threat is negligible at best. 21 
 Premise 6 identifi es the class of wars of purely political aggression. While history 
is undoubtedly replete with its murderous marauders, who make death and suff ering 
their aim, invaders’ objectives are oft en more prosaic: mayhem is not their end, but 
their means; their goal is to attain some degree of political control of a territory and 
its population. Th ey kill only because they have to; if their victims would submit at the 
outset, no blood would be shed. Th eir ultimate aims might be, among other possibili-
ties, resource extraction, imposing an exogenous ideology on the invaded state’s insti-
tutions, installing a more favourable government or simply glorifying their expanding 
empire. But their aims are exclusively political: they seek to change the institutional 
structure that governs people’s lives in a territory, not to otherwise harm the people 
themselves. Since premise 6 is probably the most contentious part of the argument 
from political aggression, I will defend it in depth in section 2.3 below. 
 2.2.3  Two evaluative claims 
 Premises 7 and 8 make two evaluative claims; fi rst that individuals’ purely political 
interests are not vital, and second that we should reject a theory of the ethics of war 
that cannot endorse lethal defence against purely political aggression. Each is intended 
to be suffi  ciently intuitively plausible that it needs little further support—although 
of course one way to resist the force of the objection is to push back against these 
intuitions. 
 A full defence of premise 7 would require a full theory of well-being, which is obvi-
ously beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is prima facie plausible: my interest 
in my state’s retaining political control of a particular territory can hardly be ranked 
alongside my interest in life or bodily integrity, for example. Suppose the Scottish 
Nationalist Party held a successful referendum on independence from the United 
Kingdom, and subsequently seceded. English, Welsh, and Northern Irish citizens of 
the UK would accordingly suff er a decisive blow to their interest in their state having 
political control of the Scottish territory. But they have surely not suff ered a loss in the 
order of being killed, kidnapped, or raped. 
 Perhaps we should distinguish between the interests of citizens of the invaded 
state who inhabit the invaded territory, and those who do not. For inhabitants of the 
invaded territory, are more potent interests at stake? Th ey probably have a weighty 
interest in remaining in their homes, and indeed in their homeland—many people 
have a profound connection to each of these. 22 However, a purely political aggressor 
will not expel inhabitants either from their home or from their homeland. Th eir goal is 
  21  Lazar, ‘Responsibility Dilemma’. See also McMahan,  chapter 6 in this volume. 
  22  See  Th omas  Hurka ,  ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’ ,  Philosophy & Public Aff airs ,  33 / 1 ( 2005 ), 
 34–66 :  55–6 ; McMahan, ‘War as Self-Defence’, 78. 
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to take control of the institutions governing a territory, which is quite consistent with 
letting the present inhabitants remain. 
 However, what if the new institutional structure denies inhabitants of the occupied 
territory political representation? Th eir interest in enfranchisement is, again, greater 
than the mere interest in their state’s continued political control of this territory. It is 
probably still not a vital interest, to preserve which we can justify killing the innocent. 
Suppose, for example, that A innocently prevents B from voting in an election—she 
has an accident outside B’s home, which prevents him from driving to the polling sta-
tion. Would B be justifi ed in harming A in order to clear a path for his car? It seems 
very unlikely. However, what if A’s obstruction is not merely a one-off , but recurs every 
time B is supposed to vote. Would we think harming A permissible in this case? On the 
assumption that A is morally innocent, it still seems wrong to harm her in order to get 
to the polling station. Th is seems even clearer when it comes to collateral harm. Even a 
long-term disenfranchisement is not morally important enough to justify killing inno-
cent people, whether intentionally or collaterally. 
 Even if these purely political interests were vital, the permissibility of defence against 
such aggression does not depend on whether the invader proposes to enfranchise the 
inhabitants of the newly acquired territory, or, indeed, on whether the inhabitants of 
that territory were enfranchised before the invasion. 
 Premise 8 is more controversial than premise 7. Why should we think being able to 
justify this particular class of wars is so important? Why not, if the argument works 
out that way, simply reject our common-sense view of national defence? Two reasons 
stand out. First, international law and national military practices refl ect a widespread 
practical commitment to the permissibility of lethal defence of sovereignty against 
purely political aggression. If we reject premise 8, then we must reject this consensus, 
and endorse radical and revisionist political prescriptions. Second, I think that even 
in wars where there are signifi cant threats to people’s vital interests, part of what justi-
fi es fi ghting is the importance of preserving those states’ political independence. Any 
account which restricts our understanding of the goals of war to those that are pursued 
in force outside of war is to that extent incomplete or misleading. While I concede that 
we do not always fi ght only for our country, it seems odd to deny that preserving politi-
cal independence plays any substantial justifying role. 
 Th ese are considerations in favour of premise 8, not decisive arguments, and one 
response is simply to deny 8, and so deny that the argument’s conclusions are trou-
bling—to simply bite the bullet, and say that we are indeed not permitted to use lethal 
force to avert purely political aggression. I think this would be a profoundly revisionist 
move, but perhaps profound revision is precisely what is needed here. 23 For the sake of 
argument, however, let us assume that premise 8 is true, in which case the conclusions 
follow: under the relevant principles of ordinary interpersonal morality, we cannot 
  23  Hence, in my view, David Rodin’s position in his chapter in this volume is the most consistent option 
open to reductionists. 
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justify lethal defence against purely political aggression, because the interests at stake 
are not vital, but fi ghting will necessarily involve killing the innocent, both inten-
tionally and collaterally, thus both as a matter of self-defence and under the rubric 
of collateral killing, warfare is disproportionate, so impermissible. If we fi nd premise 
8 convincing, then this is grounds to reject standard reductionism, and if standard 
reductionism is the most permissive, plausible variant of reductionism, then reduc-
tionism itself must go too. 
 2.3  Denying the Possibility of Purely Political 
Aggression 
 Th e standard reductionist who wishes to reject the conclusion of the argument from 
political aggression can do so by rejecting one of premises 5 to 8. I think the most 
interesting approach is to deny the evaluative claims in premises 7 or 8. Perhaps the 
objection should give us grounds to rethink the importance of our purely political 
interests—that we believe them worth fi ghting for might indicate their innate worth. 
Developing an argument to this end would undoubtedly be challenging, since accord-
ing to standard reductionism, institutions are wholly epiphenomenal to the morality 
of war, so it is hard to see how our interests in the continuation of a particular institu-
tional arrangement could be worth killing for. However, perhaps such an argument 
could be provided, and if so it would certainly be a compelling addition to the reduc-
tionist armoury. 
 However, if the reductionist rejects premise 8, then there is no need for a developed 
theory of the moral importance of our purely political interests. In my view, while a 
properly developed argument against premise 7 would be interesting, consistency 
really demands that reductionists should reject premise 8, and endorse their radi-
cally revisionist conclusions (this, indeed, was the attitude of Richard Norman and 
David Rodin, who presented the objection as a QED, not as a  reductio ). During the 
last two centuries, the morality of war has been almost universally assumed to be  sui 
generis , a property of relations among states, not among individuals, such that the nor-
mative principles governing military conduct could not possibly be derived from the 
principles appropriate to individual action outside of war. 24 Reductionism constitutes 
a profound, perhaps devastating challenge to this theoretical outlook—its principal 
contribution has been to radically undermine the most developed philosophical artic-
ulation of that conventional statist position, in Walzer’s  Just and Unjust Wars . 25 It would 
be an extraordinary coincidence if this radical rethink of how we should justify killing 
in war should yield conclusions that are in practice coextensive with the exceptionalist 
  24  See  Gregory M.  Reichberg ,  Henrik  Syse , and  Endre  Begby ,  Th e Ethics of War: Classic and Contemporary 
Readings ( Oxford :  Blackwell ,  2006 ). 
  25  See in particular McMahan,  Killing in War . 
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and statist views that it replaces. One wonders what the point of a radical theoretical 
challenge is, if it is not going to lead to radical practical conclusions. Th ere is an inter-
esting contrast with revisionism in another area of international morality, concerning 
global distributive justice. In that fi eld, there are similarly radical theoretical critiques, 
which seek to show how the current statist international order is inconsistent with 
defensible principles of interpersonal morality, but these theoretical critiques invari-
ably lead to practical critiques as well. 26 One does not oft en fi nd a cosmopolitan about 
global justice who believes that the dominant common-sense view about what human 
beings owe to one another qua human beings has a clean bill of health. 
 If we are to insist on the standard form of reductionism, then, I think we had better 
accept the bloodless invasion objection’s conclusion that warfare against purely politi-
cal aggression is unjustifi ed, but insist that, in this clash between theory and intuition, 
theory should win out. However, if we insist on defending a more conservative reduc-
tionism, we could proceed by denying either of the two descriptive claims, in premises 
5 and 6. I have already discussed 5 in enough depth for our present purposes. Th e real 
action is in denying premise 6. 27 
 Th e denial of premise 6 takes two diff erent forms. Each concedes that a purely politi-
cal aggression is conceptually possible, but one form of the response is more empiri-
cally contingent than the other. Th e more contingent response simply asserts that, as 
a matter of historical fact, there has never been a bloodless invasion, and as such the 
diffi  culty of justifying the resort to force to avert one should be of no concern, since we 
can infer from the historical record that purely political aggressions will never occur. 
Th e bloodless invasion objection is thereby dismissed as a purely theoretical worry. 
 Th e second response runs like this: in any invasion that might otherwise appear to 
satisfy premise 6, the threat to the defenders’ purely political interests at time T 0 will in 
fact be backed up with a threat to attack their vital interests at T 2 , should the defenders 
seek at T 1 to avert the initial political threat. In virtue of this subsequent T 2 threat to 
their vital interests, the defenders can justify using lethal force at T 1 —although it would 
be disproportionate to avert the T 0 threat, it is proportionate (and can be justifi ed as 
a lesser evil) when the T 2 threat is taken into account. I discuss each response in turn. 
 Th e fi rst counterargument infers from the claim that history has seen few if any blood-
less invasions the conclusion that premise 8 is misguided—justifying defence against 
purely political aggression is not a plausible desideratum on theories of the ethics of war. 
However, this obviously presupposes a further premise, namely that whether 8 holds 
depends on whether there have been any actual cases of purely political aggression. Th is 
requires substantiation, and is prima facie wrong: even if no bloodless invasions had 
  26  See, for example,  Simon  Caney ,  Justice Beyond Borders:  A  Global Political Th eory ( Oxford :   Oxford 
University Press ,  2005 ) ;  Th omas  Pogge ,  World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and 
Reforms ( Cambridge :  Polity Press ,  2002 ). 
  27  To recall: ‘6. Th ere are some purely political wars, in which the aggressors threaten only the victims’ 
interests in their state’s continued political control of some territory—their purely political interests.’ 
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ever occurred, and none were ever likely, the objection would still stand if we could 
conceive of a bloodless invasion, and believe that resistance against it would be justifi ed. 
Th e empirical counterargument is orthogonal to the central problem here. Interestingly, 
it also sits extremely ill with other elements of the standard reductionist account, which 
is typically constructed out of hypothetical cases with little or no practical application. 28 
 However, while I think that few reductionists are well placed to raise this empirical 
counterargument to the bloodless invasion objection, and that even if bloodless inva-
sions were purely hypothetical possibilities the objection would survive, the objection 
would undoubtedly have more purchase, and premise 8 would be more plausible, if we 
could demonstrate it had practical application. 
 Seeking fi rmer empirical foundations for the bloodless invasion objection, however, 
is complicated by two problems. First, the interpretation of historical events such as 
armed confl icts is likely to be even more contentious and contested than our argu-
ments for normative principles to govern war. Second, a compendious knowledge 
of historical events is not suffi  cient to establish whether history off ers cases of purely 
political aggression, because we need to know not only what actually happened, but 
what would have happened had the invaded state not resisted. As we seek arguably 
unnecessary empirical substantiation for the bloodless invasion objection, then, we 
must remember that we have moved squarely into the sphere of speculation, which 
must be treated as merely heuristic. 
 With these caveats in mind, I venture that the problem of purely political aggression 
is not merely hypothetical. Consider, for example, the recent wars fought by the United 
States and its allies. Th eir goals are oft en purely political—they aim to replace an 
unfriendly government, impose a set of institutions, or secure control over resources. 
Even when their aims exceed these, they remain tightly constrained—for example, to 
pursue a small group of people responsible for a terrorist attack. Th ey use force with 
regret, and kill only as a means to their goals. If our adversaries would simply submit 
and concede, no blood, or at least very little, will be shed. Of course, in practice quite 
the opposite has occurred—nobody would call the invasion of Iraq or Afghanistan, or 
the bombing of Libya, bloodless. Evidently, however, our assaults on those countries 
were met with violent resistance, so the option of non-violent conquest was clearly off  
the table. It is at least reasonable to believe that, if our troops had met with surrender 
and submission, we would have confi ned ourselves to securing our purely political 
objectives. For example, the Rules of Engagement apparently operational for British 
forces in Iraq in 2006 (according to a leaked document, available from Wikileaks) state 
the following general principles governing the use of force: 
 3.1.  Th e use of lethal force is permitted only to prevent loss of life or to protect mate-
riel, the loss or destruction of which could be potentially life threatening for 
Coalition Forces. 
  28  A complaint made, for example, by Walzer in  ‘Response to McMahan’s Paper’ ,  Philosophia ,  34 / 1 ( 2006 ), 
 43–5 :  34 . 
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 3.2  Force should be used as a last resort only. Whenever feasible other means 
of escalation control should be applied. E.g. verbal warnings and/or show 
of force. 
 3.3  Th e degree of force used must be no more than is reasonably necessary to con-
trol the situation. In all cases the utmost care must be taken to avoid harm to 
civilians or damage to civilian property. 29 
 It is quite conceivable that a state’s armed forces could adhere to rules of engagement 
like these, while engaged in a purely political aggression, so long as they met with no 
resistance. Moreover, when testing the implications of an account of the ethics of war, 
we should consider not only the actual historical record and the current political cli-
mate; we should also ask what would happen if this account were widely endorsed. 
And it seems that if the standard reductionist view were widely acknowledged, then 
purely political aggressions would become far more common, since expansionist gov-
ernments would know that the invaded could not justifi ably resist them. We might 
then reasonably expect states like Russia and China, which have long-simmering ter-
ritorial disputes with their neighbours, to take advantage of the opportunity to settle 
those disputes through bloodless invasion. 
 A mere appeal to history, then, is inadequate. If we want to save standard reduction-
ism, we had better argue that any likely form of purely political aggression will in fact 
be backed up with threats to vital interests, in virtue of which using lethal force can be 
proportionate. 
 Th e most promising response to the argument from political aggression focuses on 
the predictability that the aggressor will come to pose some threat to the defenders’ 
vital interests in future, even if at present only lesser interests are at stake. 30 Th ere are 
two plausible approaches. Th e fi rst simply notes that, since the aggressors will pose 
a lethal threat to the defenders if the latter resist, the defenders now face an immi-
nent threat of unjustifi ed harm to their vital interests, such as can render self-defence 
and collateral killing proportionate. Th e second observes that, even if the defenders 
now refrain from using force to defend themselves, by allowing this purely political 
aggression to succeed, they leave themselves vulnerable to future harms to their vital 
interests. 31 
 Both of these responses argue that defenders may permissibly use lethal force now, 
to avert a threat to their vital interests that is not now imminent. In the standard termi-
nology, they are arguments for preventive, not pre-emptive defence. Although immi-
nence of the threat has sometimes been thought one of the necessary conditions for 
liability, most now agree that it is no more than a useful proxy to overcome uncertainty 
over whether a threat will eventuate, and whether using lethal force is a necessary 
  29  UK Ministry Of Defence, ‘UK and Danish Rules of Engagement for Iraq’,  Wikileaks  http://wikileaks.org/
wiki/UK_and_Danish_Rules_of_Engagement_for_Iraq_2006 (accessed 26 July 2013) . 
  30  Hurka, ‘Proportionality’, 54–5; McMahan, ‘Innocence’, 196; McMahan, ‘War as Self-Defence’, 78. 
  31  McMahan and Fabre, in this volume, make both arguments. 
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response. 32 If the unjustifi ed threat is imminent, then we can be more confi dent that 
it will eventuate, and that lethal force is necessary. But if imminence is a proxy for 
suffi  ciently justifi ed belief, then we can have such a belief when the threat is further 
downstream. 
 Of the two appeals to preventive defence, the fi rst is stronger than the second. Th at 
the aggressors will fi ght back if we resist is a given in all actual cases—although not in 
hypothetically conceivable ones, which remains a problem. Th e possibility of subse-
quent unjustifi ed threats emerging, however, is much more contingent and specula-
tive. Moreover, recall that it is harder to justify using lethal force now, the weaker our 
targets’ responsibility for, and so contribution to the unjustifi ed threats that we seek to 
avert. Th e further downstream the relevant threats, the less plausible it is to hold our 
immediate targets responsible for them, and so liable to be killed in self-defence to 
avert them. 
 We should concentrate, then, on the fi rst version of this second counterargument 
to the bloodless invasion objection. 33 It is usually illustrated with a counterexample. 
Suppose you are accosted by a mugger, who demands your money or your life. You 
cannot prevent him from taking your money, except by killing him. It seems that lethal 
defence would be disproportionate in this case. 
 However, if you were to attempt a proportionate response, such as pushing him 
away, he would then act on his initial threat, and kill you. Th is suggests that you do, in 
fact, face an unjustifi ed threat to your vital interests, which can render killing the mug-
ger proportionate. In other words, at T 0 the mugger poses a threat only to your wallet. 
If you try to defend yourself proportionately in response to that threat at T 1 , then at 
T 2 he will try to kill you. 34 If you could kill him in self-defence at T 3 , in response to the 
T 2 threat, then why must you wait until T 3 to do so? Aft er all, you know at T 0 what he 
will do at T 2 . Moreover, suppose that if you wait until T 3 to defend yourself against the 
T 2 threat, your prospects of averting it diminish. One might plausibly argue that it is 
permissible to defend yourself with lethal force at T 1 in order to avert the unjustifi ed 
threat to your vital interests at T 2 , even though the initial threat at T 0 is only to your 
lesser interests. Th e relevant proportionality calculation is with the T 2 threat to your 
vital interests, not the initial T 0 threat to your lesser interests. 
 It is easy to see how this argument would be applied to the context of war. When at T 0 
the adversary combatants invade, they threaten only our political interests. If we should 
attempt a proportionate response at T 1 , however, they would fi ght back, threatening 
  32  See e.g.  David  Luban ,  ‘Preventive War’ ,  Philosophy & Public Aff airs ,  32 / 3 ( 2004 ),  207–48 ;  Suzanne 
 Uniacke , ‘On Getting One’s Retaliation in First’, in  Henry  Shue and  David  Rodin (eds.),  Preemption: Military 
Action and Moral Justifi cation ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2007 ), 69–88.   
  33  Although see McMahan,  chapter 6 in this volume, for a more sympathetic view of the second line. 
  34  Th e points in time are diff erentiated to show that defender’s action at T 1 is a response to the T 0 threat, 
and prevents the T 2 threat from coming about. Th e T 2 threat is likewise a response to defender’s action at 
T 1 . When I write that the attacker poses a threat at T 0 , this does not mean the threat will eventuate at T 0 —it 
will eventuate imminently, if the defender does nothing, but by defending himself at T 1 he could prevent the 
threat being realized. 
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our vital interests at T 2 . We should, at T 0 , be allowed to use the T 2 threat posed by our 
adversaries in the calculation of proportionality. Because we are certain that the T 2 
threat will eventuate, we do not need to wait until T 3, when the threat is already in train 
and our chances of averting it might have been diminished. Although advocates of this 
argument have not said so explicitly, it extends quite naturally over to the justifi cation 
of collateral killing. When determining proportionality in collateral harm, the relevant 
threat is not the T 0 threat to our political interests, but the T 2 threat to our vital ones. 
 Th is counterargument does not resolve the bloodless invasion objection at the 
level of principle—it is easy to conceive of a purely political aggressor that resolves 
not to fi ght back if we resist, in a form of non-violent political aggression. However, 
if it went through, it would seriously mitigate the objection’s practical implications. 
Unfortunately for standard reductionism, however, I think it begs the question against 
the more plausible form of this objection. 
 We must fi rst distinguish between two forms of conditional threat that the aggres-
sor can pose. Th e aggressor might directly threaten the victim, so that she knows that 
if she resists, she will be killed. Or the aggressor might simply resolve to defend him-
self, should the victim use the threat of lethal force against him. In the fi rst case, the 
aggressor’s threat is conditioned on the victim’s resisting in any way; in the second, the 
aggressor does not literally ‘threaten’ the victim, but instead will use lethal force, if he 
has to, to defend himself. Th e fi rst, coercive model is where the thief says ‘your money 
or your life’; the second, defensive model is where the thief simply takes your money, 
and defends himself if you try to use force to stop him doing so. 
 Although some of my arguments apply to the coercive model, I’m going to focus 
on the second, purely defensive model, which is I think most apt for the problem of 
purely political aggression. Lethal defence against an aggressor that rolls over the bor-
der, promising to kill anyone who resists, is probably justifi able in individualist terms, 
either on grounds of the attempt at coercion that it involves, or on the likelihood of 
future threats to vital interests (an aggressor prepared to issue a threat to kill all who 
resist is unlikely not to act on that threat). 35 Th e second model is also important, how-
ever. It is quite conceivable that a purely political aggressor should seek to achieve 
its political objectives not through direct coercion, but by establishing facts on the 
ground that give them control of the decisive resources or institutions. Th ey could 
advance towards their goals without issuing any threats to the aggressed-against pop-
ulace, but simply make it known that they will use force in defence of their lives and 
their mission, when it is necessary to do so, and against those who pose such threats. 
Indeed, these principles are similar to the rules of engagement by which British sol-
diers in Iraq were supposed to abide. 36 In this case, the aggressors are similar to the 
thief who resolves to take the victim’s wallet by force, but does not issue the threat 
  35  Although see Rodin,  chapter 4 in this volume, for an argument that works against even these cases of 
coercive conditional threats. 
  36  See MoD, ‘UK and Danish Rules of Engagement for Iraq’. 
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‘your money or your life’, instead only using force to defend himself against the victim’s 
resistance. 
 In these cases, where the aggressor uses force only in self-defence, his actions at 
T 2 are a response to the victim’s actions at T 1 . If the victim’s actions at T 1 were imper-
missible, then the victim could obviously not use the threat she would face at T 2 in 
her proportionality calculations at T 0 . Suppose, for example, that at T 0 the mugger 
does not intend to kill the victim. Th e victim, however, responds to this threat wildly 
disproportionately at T 1 , making to throw a grenade at the mugger, who (suppose) is 
surrounded by children, who will be killed alongside him. At T 2 , the mugger will try 
to prevent the victim throwing that grenade, by shooting him. Clearly, in this case 
the victim cannot use the threat he will face at T 2 in his proportionality calculations 
at T 0 . In general, the appeal to preventive defence must presuppose that any relevant 
actions taken by the victim between now and when the threat eventuates should be 
permissible. 
 Or consider this example. A is insulting B. He ought not to do so, but he clearly does 
not threaten a serious interest of hers. B knows that if she tries to prevent A insulting 
her by using lethal force against him, he will try to kill her. So, can she conclude that 
since A will try to kill her if she uses lethal force to stop him insulting her, it is propor-
tionate for her to use lethal force, before he has the chance to do so? Clearly she cannot. 
Lethal force is not a proportionate means to stop someone insulting you, and it can-
not be rendered proportionate by the fact that, if you attempt to use lethal force, the 
insulter will try to defend himself lethally. 
 It follows that the argument from preventive defence begs the question, at least 
when the attacker’s lethal threat is conditioned on the defender fi rst threatening his life 
(in other words, when the attacker will use force only in self-defence). If the mugger 
resolves to use force at T 2 only to defend himself against a lethal threat at T 1 , then we 
cannot argue that lethal defence by the victim at T 1 is proportionate, without presup-
posing that it is justifi ed—which is precisely what we are trying to show. Th e threat 
posed by mugger at T 2 is admissible in the T 0 proportionality calculation only if the 
victim’s actions at T 1 are justifi ed; the victim’s actions at T 1 are justifi ed only if the threat 
posed by the mugger at T 2 is admissible in the T 0 proportionality calculation. Applied 
to the military context, provided the purely political aggressors resolve to use force at 
T 2 only in response to lethal threats at T 1 , then we cannot argue that this lethal response 
by the victims is proportionate except by assuming that it is justifi ed. 
 Notice that the argument does not depend on showing that the victim’s response 
to the initial threat is disproportionate. Th ese examples are merely illustrations of a 
more general logical point. A cannot without circularity at T 0 justify using lethal force 
at T 1 to prevent a threat, to be posed by B at T 2 , which is conditioned on A’s using lethal 
force at T 1 . A’s use of lethal force at T 1 is permissible only if B’s threat at T 2 renders 
lethal force proportionate in the T 0 proportionality calculation. But B’s threat at T 2 is 
admissible in A’s justifi cation at T 0 only if A’s action at T 1 is permissible. Th e preventive 
defence-based response to the bloodless invasion objection therefore works only if it 
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assumes that lethal defence against purely political aggression is justifi ed, which is pre-
cisely what it is supposed to prove. 
 How might a reductionist respond to this circularity objection? One might argue 
that, provided we know that B’s threat at T 2 will be unjustifi ed regardless of A’s inter-
vening actions, the justifi cation from preventive defence is admissible, and A can use 
the T 2 threat in his T 0 proportionality calculations. What matters is not the chain of 
events that leads to the threat at T 2 , but simply whether that threat is unjustifi ed. 
 Th e circularity objection is particularly forceful when the justifi cation of the T 2 
threat depends on the justifi cation of the defender’s actions at T 1 . Suppose, for example, 
that the combatants fi ghting for the purely political aggressor are publicly resolved to 
use force only in defence of their lives, when it is necessary to do so, and against those 
who are responsible for posing those threats. One ground on which the threat they 
pose at T 2 could be unjustifi ed, then, is that the threat to which they respond is itself 
justifi ed. But the argument from preventive defence justifi es lethal defence at T 1 by 
assuming (at T 0 ) that the threat posed by the aggressor at T 2 will be unjustifi ed. To 
show that the T 2 threat is unjustifi ed, we must show that the T 1 threat is justifi ed; but 
to show that the T 1 threat is justifi ed, we must assume that the T 2 threat is unjustifi ed. 
 However, there are other reasons besides the fact that it responds to an unjustifi ed 
threat which can make the T 2 threat unjustifi ed. If these are in play, then does the cir-
cularity objection still apply? One could argue that any use of force by a purely political 
aggressor, even in self-defence, can be justifi ed only if it is in some sense necessary 
(the precise interpretation of necessity does not matter here). 37 Since purely political 
aggressors could defend themselves by retreating, thereby foregoing their military 
objectives, any force they use in self-defence is unnecessary, and therefore impermis-
sible on those grounds alone, irrespective of whether the defenders’ actions at T 1 are 
justifi ed, so there is no circularity problem. 
 One way to respond would be to question whether the aggressors really could not 
satisfy necessity. Whatever our theory of necessity, it seems misguided to imply that 
purely political aggressors could simply down arms and pull out. Th is may be true of 
them en masse, but for each individual soldier, retreat or surrender is oft en likely to 
increase, not diminish, his chances of being harmed. Using force to defend himself and 
his comrades may well be his only way to get out alive. So, the counterargument has 
limited scope. Nonetheless, it will apply in some cases, so deserves a response. 
 I think it fails as a response to the circularity objection. If a threat posed by B at 
T 2 will eventuate only if A acts unjustifi ably at T 1 , then even if that future threat will 
be unjustifi ed on independent grounds, it remains inadmissible in A’s proportionality 
calculation at T 0 , because it is conditioned on his intervening wrongful action at T 1 . 
If that action is wrongful, he ought not to do it, and the T 2 threat will not eventuate. 
He may not harm another now to avert a threat that will come about only if he acts 
  37  Although for a sustained analysis, see  Seth  Lazar ,  ‘Necessity in Self-Defense and War’ ,  Philosophy & 
Public Aff airs ,  40 / 1 , ( 2012 )  3–43 . 
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unjustifi ably. It follows that if B’s T 2 threat is conditioned on A’s use of lethal force at T 1 , 
A cannot appeal to the T 2 threat posed by B in his T 0 proportionality calculation with-
out assuming that his use of lethal force at T 1 is justifi ed, and so begging the question 
that the argument is supposed to answer. Notice that this reasoning applies as much to 
the coercive as to the defensive version of the conditional threat case. B’s reasons for 
harming A at T 2 can be either in self-defence, or in order to make good on her initial 
threat to A. 
 In summary, then, the argument from preventive defence can presuppose its conclu-
sion in two ways. First, by assuming the threat posed by the aggressor at T 2 is unjusti-
fi ed, when whether that is true depends on whether the T 1 threat is justifi ed. Th is will 
not always apply—sometimes there will be independent grounds for believing the T 2 
threat unjustifi ed, regardless of whether the T 1 threat is justifi ed. However, the second 
circularity is not contingent in this way. Th e T 2 threat is inadmissible to the T 0 propor-
tionality calculation if it is a response to unjustifi ed action by A at T 1 . To include the 
T 2 threat in A’s T 0 proportionality calculation, then, is to assume that A’s action at T 1 is 
justifi ed. But it is precisely that action (on which B’s response is conditioned) that the 
argument is supposed to justify. On this argument, we can justify A’s T 0 response only 
by assuming that it is justifi ed. Th is second circularity is present even when we have 
independent grounds to believe the T 2 threat will be unjustifi ed. 
 Might one nonetheless counter that it is strange that the mugger can, merely by 
making his conditional threat, leave you no other morally acceptable option but to 
capitulate? 38 Although this does not address the circularity problem, it might indicate 
that we need to rethink it. However, this does not seem a compelling response. Th ere 
are many ways besides through making a conditional threat that a mugger can leave 
his victim with no morally acceptable alternative besides capitulation—he could posi-
tion himself so that there is no way for the victim to defend herself without infl icting 
disproportionate harm on bystanders; or, if he is strong enough, he could make it so 
she has no way to protect her wallet except to kill him; alternatively, the same situation 
arises if he is so frail that any resistance would kill him. In each case, assuming it is dis-
proportionate to kill just to retain her wallet, the victim has no choice but to yield. Nor 
should this surprise us. Principles of self-defence constrain otherwise justifi ed defence 
in ways that an unscrupulous attacker can manipulate. Th e only way to avoid this out-
come is either to deny that those principles should be genuine constraints, or to argue 
that using lethal force to retain one’s wallet is in fact proportionate. 
 Th e circularity objection could be escaped if we could provide grounds for the vic-
tim’s initial defence being justifi ed, which do not depend on including the conditional 
threat (CT) that is conditioned on that defence in the argument for its justifi cation. 39 
One might think, however, that this counterargument is a non-starter. Insofar as the 
  38  McMahan, ‘War as Self-Defence’, 78. Hurka makes a very similar point at Hurka, ‘Proportionality’, 54. 
  39  Th anks to Cécile Fabre for helping me think this through. 
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eventuation of CT is a foreseeable consequence of the victim’s defensive actions, it 
must be included in our assessment of those actions’ proportionality. If the threat is 
great enough, then perhaps any defensive action would be disproportionate. 40 For the 
sake of argument, however, let us set that worry aside, and suppose that we could, in 
principle, establish that the victim’s initial defence is justifi ed without CT telling either 
for or against that defence. 
 Here is one possibility. Even if lethal defence is disproportionate, presumably (if CT 
is set to one side) some use of force by the victim to avert the initial threat (IT) posed 
at T 0 by the aggressor would be proportionate. Suppose that if the victim were to pro-
tect herself against IT using proportionate force (call this PF), the aggressor would use 
some additional force (call this AF) to secure his objectives. In that case, the victim 
can presumably use the latter quantum of threat (IT+AF) in her initial proportionality 
calculations, thus increasing the amount of force that would be proportionate, than 
if it were only a matter of averting IT—call it PF*. Th ere is no circularity yet, because 
PF is justifi ed without reference to CT. But suppose that if the victim uses PF* force, 
the aggressor will respond with more additional force—AF*. Th en the victim would 
be able to use force proportionate to (IT+AF*), i.e. more than PF*, say PF**. If our 
reasoning proceeds incrementally in this way, we could reach a situation where it is 
proportionate for the victim to use lethal force to defend herself, not because of the 
conditional threat CT, but because of the additional force AF*** which the aggressor 
would use in order to achieve the initial threat IT should the victim use PF*** force to 
defend herself. 
 In the mugger example, the idea is something like this. Th ough it’s disproportionate 
for the victim to just kill the mugger outright, suppose she uses proportionate force—
she pushes him back. Suppose he would respond by using more initial force against 
here; can we not then say that she is permitted to use defensive force proportionate to 
this additional threat? We might then proceed incrementally to the justifi cation of vic-
tim using lethal defensive force, without any circularity. In the military case, suppose 
we respond to the purely political aggression by forming a human chain around the 
aggressor’s targets, so that they cannot secure them except by threatening our lives. In 
that case, we would be entitled to kill them in self-defence. So why should we have to 
actually put ourselves at risk by forming the human chain? Why not proceed immedi-
ately to the lethal defence? 
 Although I  think that this incrementalist response has some virtues (albeit that 
simplicity is not one of them) it ultimately fails. Intuitively, it fails because it proves 
too much. Suppose that the initial threat posed by the aggressor is that he is going to 
pinch the victim. But suppose that he will defend himself and his mission (to pinch 
her) against any force the victim uses in her defence. So the victim responds propor-
tionately, by trying to pinch him fi rst (this is PF). Th e aggressor averts that pinch by 
  40  Th is is one of David Rodin’s key arguments in  chapter 4 of this volume. 
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making to pinch and also punch the victim. Th at’s the initial threat IT and the addi-
tional force AF. Th is larger threat renders a graver defence by the victim proportion-
ate—PF*. But that additional force used by the victim leads to the aggressor using still 
more additional force—AF*, which in turn renders a still graver defence by the vic-
tim proportionate—PF**. And in this incremental way we can reach a situation where 
the only way to stop the aggressor pinching her (and infl icting the additional force 
AF*** on her) is to kill him. If this response to the circularity objection works, then 
it is proportionate for the victim to kill the aggressor, ultimately, to prevent him from 
pinching her. 
 Th e second problem with the incrementalist response is more internal. It rests 
on a very specifi c and involuted series of counterfactuals. Th is is how it achieves 
the bootstrapping whereby the threat of a pinch can become grounds for killing 
someone. Th e argument depends on saying that ‘if I were to X, then you’d Y, but if 
you would Y, then I could X1, but if I X1’d, then you would Y1, and if you would Y1, 
I could X2,’ and so on to the nth and n-1th value of X and Y. Th is leads to at least two 
problems. 
 First, we can legitimately question whether the permission to use lethal force can 
depend on speculation about such complex counterfactuals. Arguably rather than 
simply rest on assumptions about what would happen if we took all these intermedi-
ate steps, we actually ought to take those steps. Rather than say ‘we’re entitled to use 
lethal force now, because if we resisted non-violently, they would use greater force, 
which would entitle us to use greater force, which would lead to greater force from 
them, which would entitle us to use greater force, ultimately leading to us being enti-
tled to use lethal force’, this incrementalist argument looks like it enjoins us to actu-
ally take those intermediate steps. In practice this would mean fi rst resisting political 
aggression non-violently, and using lethal force only once the aggressor has started to 
threaten our vital interests. 
 Second, there is an important range of cases where the counterfactual story 
required for the incrementalist response to work will simply not obtain. Th e incre-
mentalist response fails just in case there is no way for the victim to avert the initial 
threat except by using lethal force against the aggressor. In the mugger example, 
suppose that the mugger is much stronger than the victim, and simply immobilizes 
her while he takes her wallet. Her only means of protecting the wallet is to kill him. 
Or that he takes her wallet and runs off —she can bring him down only by shoot-
ing him. In a military context, suppose that the aggressor establishes facts on the 
ground that can be changed only by using lethal force. In each of these cases the 
incrementalist response fails. Th e only way to avert the initial threat is to kill the 
aggressor; this is by hypothesis a disproportionate means of averting that initial 
threat; and the prospect of the aggressor defending himself with lethal force against 
the victim’s attempt to kill him cannot be used to render that attempt proportionate 
without circularity. 
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 2.4  Alternative Reductionisms 
 Neither the contingent empirical counterargument, nor the conceptual challenge 
from preventive defence, succeeds in undermining premise 6. If we endorse the other 
descriptive and evaluative premises 5, 7, and 8, then we must either endorse the con-
clusion, and reject reductionism, or we must show how by modifying premises 2, 3, or 
4, we can develop a version of reductionism that can ground the permission to fi ght 
defensive wars against purely political aggression—what Emerton and Handfi eld call 
the ‘political defensive privilege’. 41 In this section and the next, I consider three ways to 
ground the political defensive privilege, each of which does more violence to stand-
ard reductionism than the last. Th e fi rst merely modifi es premises 3 and 4, the second 
proposes an alternative to premise 2, while the third, discussed in section 2.5, rejects 
reductionism in favour of exceptionalism. 
 One way a reductionist might ground the political defensive privilege is by modify-
ing, or at least adding to, premises 3 and 4. Aft er all, they specify only a narrow range 
of the relevant principles of interpersonal morality. Perhaps they leave something out 
that might help here. Although when defending oneself, or a small number of others, 
vital interests must be at stake for killing the innocent either intentionally or collat-
erally to be justifi ed, perhaps if enough people’s lesser interests are at stake, they can 
together justify lethal force. Th e problem of proportionality in self-defence and collat-
eral damage is overcome, on this view, by aggregating the lesser interests of the invaded 
state’s citizens. 42 
 Although the move to aggregation is popular among reductionists, it is not a prom-
ising response to the bloodless invasion objection, for at least three reasons, of which at 
least the third is decisive. 
 First, aggregation cuts both ways: although the victims of a purely political aggres-
sion are numerous, the innocent victims of war (on both sides) will be numerous too. 
I am not sure whether these two aggregations will cancel each other out, and indeed 
I wonder whether we can confi dently weigh such numerous and disparate interests. 
 Second, I wonder whether this move to aggregation is consistent with the core thesis 
of reductionism. I cannot think of any other cases, outside of war, where the same phe-
nomenon would apply—where a large number of aggregated lesser interests can justify 
killing innocent people in self-defence and collateral harm. It seems, then, that war is 
indeed morally exceptional, since the principles that justify killing in war do not justify 
any other acts besides those of war. 
 Th ird, and most importantly, though, aggregation of lesser interests is simply an 
implausible foundation for the political defensive privilege, because it entails that the 
scope and weight of that privilege will vary in proportion to a political community’s 
  41  Emerton and Handfi eld,  chapter 3 in this volume. 
  42  Hurka, ‘Proportionality’, 54; McMahan, ‘War as Self-Defence’, 79. See also Fabre,  chapter  5 in this 
volume. 
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population size. Th e more citizens, the more people whose lesser interest in their state 
retaining political control of a territory is at stake. Th e more people, the greater the 
aggregated sum of their lesser political interests. Th e greater that sum, the easier it is 
for them to justify resorting to force against a purely political aggression, and the more 
innocent people they can justify killing to defend their political independence. So, in 
a war over territory between Pakistan and India, the latter would be entitled to kill 
more Pakistanis than Pakistanis could kill Indians, because 1.2bn Indian citizens pur-
portedly have an interest in control of that territory, while only 0.2bn Pakistanis have 
the same interest. And yet clearly if we endorse something like the political defensive 
privilege, we ascribe it equally to states regardless of their population size. While there 
might be grounds for questioning the international legal doctrine of sovereign equal-
ity—some states are presumably insuffi  ciently valuable to warrant defence—mere dif-
ferences in population size are surely morally irrelevant. 
 One could perhaps respond by arguing that political interests have diminishing 
marginal moral importance, such that once you have a country with a certain popu-
lation, any additional citizens do not increase the moral importance of the political 
interests at stake. However, this would be a signifi cant move away from the individual-
ist approach, since it presupposes that the moral weight of an individual’s interests is a 
function of how large a group of similarly interested individuals he is in. Th is looks like 
an argument for war in defence of irreducibly collective rights, not a thoroughgoing 
individualist account. 
 Merely shift ing the focus to aggregation, then, is not enough. Reductionists remain 
incapable of grounding the political defensive privilege. Th eir next available move 
is more radical, but perhaps more promising. It involves rejecting not only premises 
3 and 4, but premise 2 as well—in other words, it proposes a non-standard form of 
reductionism. Perhaps if we look to other principles of ordinary interpersonal moral-
ity besides those covering self-defence and collateral harm, we can develop a basis for 
the political defensive privilege. 
 Standard reductionism, as formulated in the bloodless invasion objection, is clearly 
correlated with a nonconsequentialist view of morality, which sees people as enjoy-
ing fundamental protections against being used and harmed in various ways, even if 
harming them would realize a more valuable state of aff airs. 43 Perhaps reductionists 
would do better to adopt a consequentialist view of the ordinary interpersonal moral-
ity governing permissible killing. Th ey might endorse either act or rule consequential-
ism, while remaining reductionists about the ethics of war—since they would argue 
that in war as in ordinary life, we should follow the maxim ‘act so as to realize the most 
valuable state of aff airs’, or ‘act in accordance with the rule that, in the long run, realizes 
the most valuable state of aff airs’. 
  43  See e.g.  Frances M.  Kamm , ‘Nonconsequentialism’, in  Hugh  Lafollette (ed.),  Th e Blackwell Guide 
to Ethical Th eory ( Malden :   Blackwell ,  2001 ),  205–26 ;  Warren S.  Quinn ,  ‘Actions, Intentions, and 
Consequences: Th e Doctrine of Double Eff ect’ ,  Philosophy and Public Aff airs ,  18 / 4 ( 1989 ),  334–51 . 
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 In theory, shift ing to a consequentialist position should lower the bar to justify kill-
ing. However, I think premises 3 and 4 genuinely specify the most permissive plausible 
take on when killing is allowed, whether one is a consequentialist or a nonconsequen-
tialist: killing the innocent to preserve less than vital interests is simply never going to 
be justifi ed. We have already seen that moving to aggregation does not help resolve this 
problem. If consequentialist reductionists are going to fare any better than the non-
consequentialist, they have to identify some other values besides individuals’ interests 
that are worth fi ghting for. If they concede that individuals’ purely political interests 
are not that important, they must argue one of the following: that there are distinct 
collective interests in the political independence of a particular community, which can 
justify killing; that there is some impersonal value in the continued independence of 
a political community; or that there are some broader long-term values that must be 
brought into our calculation. I doubt whether any of these moves is genuinely consist-
ent with the reductionist perspective—although the consequentialist pays lip service 
to reductionism, the values that are at stake in war include some that are quite diff erent 
from the values at stake when force is used in ordinary life. 
 Moreover, it is far from clear that an act-consequentialist approach to the ethics of 
war would end up grounding a political defensive privilege. Certainly, it would depend 
on the particular case; choosing to resist a purely political aggression with force 
involves realizing a state of aff airs in which each side infl icts suff ering and devastation 
on the other. Th e alternative involves sacrifi cing only the purely political interests of 
the citizens of the invaded state. It is hard to imagine that war would not constitute a 
worse state of aff airs, such that the act-consequentialist would deny states the privilege 
to defend themselves. 
 A rule-consequentialist might fare better here. Th e rule-consequentialist could 
argue that, if we do not resist purely political aggression now, it will become wide-
spread, and lead to even more numerous and greater harms than would fi ghting now. 44 
For example, one might argue that in order to have a stable system of relations among 
states, which is in turn necessary for people to live good lives, we need something 
like a principle of respect for political independence. Since there is no other means 
to enforce this principle except through self-help, states must be entitled to defend 
themselves against purely political aggression. Th e defenders are fi ghting not only for 
their own purely political interests, but for the purely political interests of all people 
everywhere, who are all made more vulnerable each time a purely political aggressor 
claims territory unchallenged. 
 Th ere is probably considerable mileage in this argument, although it does involve 
making some very substantial theoretical commitments, which might have more trou-
bling implications when set in other contexts. Ultimately, though, I do not think it can 
plausibly be described as reductionist, except in the thinnest sense. If what justifi es 
  44  See McMahan,  chapter 6, and Moore,  chapter 8 in this volume. 
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killing the innocent in war is the importance of preventing future purely political 
aggressions (as well as this one) then we are defi nitely far from the realm of ordinary 
interpersonal morality; the justifi cation for these acts of killing cannot be understood 
without acknowledging that they are acts of killing in war, not ordinary life. Justifi ed 
wars fought for these reasons will not simply be justifi ed acts of self- and other-defence. 
Th ey will also be justifi ed by their contribution to maintaining a stable international 
system. 
 2.5  Desiderata for an Exceptionalist Alternative 
 If we are going to give a plausible account of what is worth fi ghting for in wars of 
national defence generally, and wars against purely political aggression in particular, 
then it looks like we need to reject reductionism. Th e goods that it is worth killing 
for in ordinary life simply are not suffi  cient to explain the permissibility of killing in 
war. Th e challenge, then, is to develop a plausible exceptionalist account of what is 
worth fi ghting for, which can fi ll the gap identifi ed by the bloodless invasion objec-
tion, without inviting further unanswerable objections. Evidently, I cannot attempt 
that task in what remains of this chapter; however, I can identify some desiderata on 
what such an account should look like, specifi cally three positive requirements, and 
two negative ones. 
 Th e bloodless invasion objection shows that the individual interests immediately 
at stake in a war of purely political aggression are not suffi  ciently weighty to justify 
killing the innocent. If killing the innocent is nonetheless justifi ed, then either there 
must be other individual interests that a simple description of the case has missed, 
or there must be other goods besides individual interests that are at stake. Th e fi rst 
positive requirement on an exceptionalist account of what justifi es wars of national 
defence is that it must identify the goods, beyond the immediately threatened indi-
vidual interests, which justify fi ghting. Th ere are three plausible avenues (which need 
not be mutually exclusive). 
 As we have just seen, the fi rst, and least controversial, is to appeal not only to the 
immediately implicated individual interests, but also to the long-term interests of 
all people. Th is is the (in spirit) rule-consequentialist argument that submission to 
aggression now, even if it is purely political, will invite future harms, to avert which 
we are justifi ed in killing the innocent now, as a lesser evil. Speculative though it is, 
this argument is undoubtedly an important constituent in the justifi cation of wars of 
national defence in general, although it does not, to my mind, capture the full force of 
what is worth fi ghting for in defence against purely political aggression in particular. 
Aft er all, if the aggressor’s success in this bloodless invasion were only to lead to more 
purely political aggression in future, then the interests at stake in the future will be 
precisely the same ones as do not justify killing the innocent when the present case is 
taken in isolation. Of course, by looking to the future we increase the number of people 
whose political interests are potentially at stake, but we have seen that grounding the 
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permission to kill in individuals’ aggregated purely political interests leads to deeply 
implausible implications about what can permissibly be done to defend more and less 
populous political communities. 
 For these reasons, I think the most interesting alternatives to the reduction of war-
fare to self- and other-defence will not only invoke other individual interests besides 
those immediately at stake, but will look to collective and impersonal goods to explain 
what justifi es fi ghting. Impersonal goods are values the signifi cance of which is irre-
ducible to some contribution to or constituent of individual well-being; one might 
think that the value of a just or a solidaristic community, for example, does not 
reduce to the contributions its justice and solidarity make to its members’ well-being. 
Collective goods are a subset of impersonal goods, but can be thought of in one of two 
ways. Either we could argue that (some) groups of people can have interests distinct 
from and irreducible to the interests of their constituent members. Or we could argue 
that the advancement of (some) groups is impersonally valuable, without making the 
metaphysical claim that a group can have interests. Either way, if wars are not fought 
only for individual interests, then we need some account of precisely what the other 
values at stake are. 45 
 Both impersonal and collective values are philosophically fraught. 46 Th e thesis that 
nothing has value besides the constituents of individual well-being is both plausible 
in itself, and widely assumed in moral and political philosophy. Demonstrating that 
there are indeed other sources of moral reasons besides individual interests is diffi  cult 
enough; showing that these are suffi  ciently weighty to justify killing innocent people is 
a further stretch still. However, if we want to retain our common-sense view of a politi-
cal community’s right to defend itself against purely political aggression, then I think 
we need to forge some argument along these lines. Moreover, we need to do so without 
proving too much: the view that collective or impersonal goods can justify overriding 
individual interests has been the normative opening for some of history’s worst atroci-
ties. Reclaiming these arguments from their history of heinous abuse is a profound 
challenge in itself. 
 Th e second positive requirement is an extension of the fi rst, identifying the descrip-
tive terrain in which the values that are worth killing for must be discovered. Wars 
  45  McMahan never added to this, but he recognized it in an earlier paper: ‘Extrapolation has to proceed by 
composition rather than by analogy, but even the most reductive form of individualism must take account of 
distinctively collective goods, such as collective self-identifi cation or collective self-determination, and thus 
recognize that there may be wrongs that are not entirely reducible to wrongs against individuals because 
they have a collective as their subject.’  Jeff   McMahan ,  ‘Just Cause for War’ ,  Ethics & International Aff airs ,  19 / 3 
( 2005 ),  1–21 : 12. In this volume, Moore and Kutz in particular attempt to give some account of what other 
values are at stake in war, besides individual rights. 
  46  For discussion of impersonal value in the context of distributive justice, see e.g.  Andrew  Mason , 
 Community, Solidarity and Belonging:  Levels of Community and Th eir Normative Signifi cance 
( Cambridge :   Cambridge University Press ,  2000 ) ;  Andrew  Moore and  Roger  Crisp ,  ‘Welfarism in Moral 
Th eory’ ,  Australasian Journal of Philosophy ,  74 / 4 ( 1996 ),  598–613 ;  Larry S.  Temkin , ‘Harmful Goods, Harmless 
Bads’, in  R. G.  Frey and  Christopher W.  Morris (eds.),  Value, Welfare, and Morality ( Cambridge :  Cambridge 
University Press ,  1993 ),  290–324 . 
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of national defence, especially against purely political aggression, are fought in part 
to preserve a particular institutional arrangement, whereby one political community 
has political control over a given territory and its population. If we think wars against 
purely political aggression can be justifi ed, and that even in regular wars of national 
defence, preserving the present institutional arrangement plays some justifi catory 
role, then we need to explain why preserving this institutional arrangement matters. 
Th is is the site of the collective and impersonal values identifi ed in the fi rst require-
ment. Th ree interrelated lines of argument could be developed (again, they need not 
be mutually exclusive). Th e fi rst focuses on why political communities have value, and 
in particular, the sort of value that is worth killing to preserve. It can proceed by exam-
ining both the internal qualities of the community, for example its achievement of 
justice, 47 or a vibrant solidarity, and its external qualities—for example, how it contrib-
utes to maintaining an internationally stable system. Th e second line would be to ask 
why it should matter that political communities should be independent from outside 
interference (beyond some threshold)? 48 Why should we care about the survival and 
independence of political communities that are oft en historically contingent? Does it 
matter only insofar as it allows the political community to achieve the values identifi ed 
in the fi rst line of argument, or is there some distinct value in the community achieving 
these goods in their own way? Th e third line of argument starts with the observation 
that, to arrive at a plausible view of national defence, we would need to ask not only 
why it matters that this group of people should be able to determine their collective 
existence together, but also why they should do so in this particular place, on this ter-
ritory. Purely political aggression undermines the victim community’s independence, 
but it does so by taking control of territory in particular. Does this territorial dimen-
sion matter? 49 Is there an important connection between the political community and 
the specifi c territory it happens to occupy? Can this be understood in individualist 
terms, or do we need to appeal to collective or impersonal values to explain why retain-
ing control of this particular territory should matter so much? 
 Th e fi nal positive requirement is that the exceptionalist justifi cation for national 
defence should be to some degree partialist. It should explain why the value that is 
worth fi ghting for in wars of national defence is in part relative to the identity of the 
agents doing the fi ghting. To see why, consider the following example. Two countries 
are involved in a confl ict of disputed origin over a contested territory. Whether they are 
justifi ed in fi ghting depends in part on the set of collective and/or impersonal goods 
alluded to above. Suppose that one community better instantiates these values than 
the other. Does it follow that citizens of the less valuable community are not justifi ed 
in defending themselves—that they must concede to the more valuable community? If 
  47  See  Seth  Lazar ,  ‘A Liberal Defence of (Some) Duties to Compatriots’ ,  Journal of Applied Philosophy ,  27 / 3 
( 2010 ),  246–57 . Also Kutz,  chapter 10 in this volume. 
  48  See Moore,  chapter 8 this volume. 
  49  See Stilz,  chapter 9 in this volume. 
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we construed the values at stake impartially, then this would follow, but it appears obvi-
ously implausible. Presumably, our community must meet some threshold of value to 
be worth fi ghting for, but once it meets that threshold, then we are entitled to fi ght for 
our own community, even if the adversary community is more valuable in every way. 
 A viable exceptionalist justifi cation for national defence would also have to meet at 
least two negative desiderata. First, it must either explain why the principles of ordi-
nary interpersonal morality do not apply in war, or it must show that its arguments 
operate in addition to ordinary moral principles, not instead of them. Th e fi rst path is 
unlikely to be an easy one. Reductionists can quite reasonably insist that even if their 
account does not cover the whole scope of the ethics of war, absent some compel-
ling argument to the contrary we must surely acknowledge that the principles gov-
erning the use of force outside of war still in large part apply. Showing the opposite 
would mean arguing that the initiation of confl ict between large groups of belligerents 
also initiates a fundamental and profound change in the moral protections that peo-
ple enjoy against suff ering harm. Although such an argument can be made, it would 
require a tremendous amount of work to be convincing. 50 One possible approach is to 
deny that we enjoy these protections except in an institutional context, and then argue 
that the shift  in institutional context from ordinary life to war changes the protections 
that we enjoy. 51 But it is quite implausible to suggest that, absent an institutional con-
text, we can kill innocent people without wrongdoing. 
 If the exceptionalist cannot show that reductionist principles are irrelevant to war, 
she must show how her theory incorporates those principles. Of course, she must also 
identify further values that can override the considerations identifi ed by a reduction-
ist account, or go beyond what they alone would permit. But those considerations will 
remain relevant to the morality of war, and might indeed still carry a considerable 
explanatory and justifi catory weight. 
 Th e second negative desideratum is complementary to the fi rst. Just as the excep-
tionalist must either explain why the ordinary principles governing the use of force 
do not apply in war, or else incorporate them into her account, so she must either 
explain why the exceptionalist principles to which she appeals to justify war do not 
apply outside of wartime, or show that although they are relevant in ordinary life, they 
do not have troubling and untenable implications in other contexts. Th is is particu-
larly true of the appeal to collective or impersonal values: if they can justify killing in 
war, then are there other circumstances outside of war when they can justify killing? 
What are the implications of adopting views such as these about war for our attitude 
to national liberation movements, and political secession, for example? If the values 
that we appeal to, in order to justify and explain our judgments about national defence, 
  50  Some of that work is being done in this book, by Benbaji,  chapter 7. 
  51  One could draw inspiration here from  Allen  Buchanan and  Robert O.  Keohane ,  ‘Th e Preventive Use of 
Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal’ ,  Ethics & International Aff airs ,  18 / 1 ( 2004 ),  1–22 . 
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have problematic implications in these other areas, then we might be forced to accept a 
wholly reductionist approach as the lesser of two evils. 
 2.6  Conclusion 
 Our ordinary view of the ethics of war grants states the right to use lethal force to resist 
purely political aggression by other states. Providing an adequate philosophical foun-
dation for this political defensive privilege, however, proves remarkably tricky. Th e 
most natural way for philosophers to approach the justifi cation of killing in war—to 
see it as a particular case, to which general principles governing permissible killing 
can be applied—has proven inadequate to the task, at least on some very plausible 
assumptions. If I am right that wars cannot be fought without killing the innocent, 
and that individuals’ interests in their state’s retaining political control of some terri-
tory are not vital, then the most permissive plausible version of reductionism cannot 
justify national defence against a purely political threat, since it cannot endorse killing 
the innocent to preserve less than vital interests. Th is could spell the end either for 
reductionism, or for the political defensive privilege. I considered whether reformulat-
ing the reductionist position would resolve the problem, but it led either to implausi-
ble views about the relation between population size and the scope and weight of the 
political defensive privilege, or to a rule-consequentialist position that is not meaning-
fully reductionist. If we want to retain the political defensive privilege, we need to look 
beyond reductionist arguments to an exceptionalist account of the legitimate purposes 
of military force. We need to ask why political independence is worth fi ghting for, and 
show that it matters not only because of its contribution to the interests of the indi-
vidual members of the political community, but in some irreducible impersonal and/
or collective sense as well. We need to show why this value matters enough to justify 
killing the innocent in war, without proving too much. And we need to show how this 
exceptionalist framework for war’s morality either supersedes or complements the 
reductionist principles with which we began. Th e task is formidable, but necessary if 
we are to make sense of our pre-theoretical beliefs about the ethics of war. 
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